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 ‘Canada Steps Up’—Task Force to Modernize 
Securities Legislation in Canada: recommendations 
and discussion 
 






There is a Canadian discount in the cost of equity capital. One study observed that the 
cost of equity capital in Canada is 25 basis points higher than in the US1 and a second 
noted that valuations of Canadian public companies are significantly lower than those 
found in the US.2 There are a number of possible explanations of this latter observation: 
first, there are many companies in the Canadian capital market that have either dual 
class or pyramid share structures; these structures can lead to problems from the 
divergence of ownership and control3; second, there may be a perception (or even reality) 
that enforcement of securities legislation is less vigorous in Canada than that found in 
the US. Whatever the explanation, attempts to, at a minimum, remove this discount are 
important to improving Canadian economic growth. 
Key points 
• The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada released its report entitled ‘Canada 
Steps Up’ in October 2006. Its 65 recommendations focused on bringing Canadian securities law into 
the 21st century, enhancing Canada’s competitiveness in the global marketplace and eliminating its 
higher cost of capital relative to the US. 
• This article reviews and analyses the Task Force’s recommendations in five critical areas: cost–benefit 
analysis (CBA), improving access to capital markets, the use from electronic disclosure systems and 
financial literacy, the regulation of hedge funds and finally, enforcement. 
• This article also reviews two issues that received significant Task Force discussion, but were left as 
ideas for consideration, namely an insurance scheme for misinformation in the capital markets and 
subsidizing securities analysis to improve analyst coverage of small firms. 
• Finally, conclusions are drawn from the Task Force’s deliberations and recommendations and next 
steps are suggested. 
 
Competitive capital markets are crucial to an economy. From an issuer’s perspective, 
they facilitate raising capital from domestic and increasing numbers of international 
investors at reasonable cost thereby enhancing business operations and generating 
employment. If the Canadian capital market is viewed as a good venue to raise funds, 
new companies will issue, sophisticated investors will enter  the  market  and  securities 
prices will reflect better the underlying value of issuers’ equity (referred to as an 
improvement in price discovery). Liquidity will also increase. Both domestic issuers and 
investors will be better off. However, if investors believe that the capital market is open to 
manipulation, that there is false or incomplete information, that corporate governance is 
not effective and/or they are not being treated fairly, investors will either leave the market 
or if they stay, they will reduce the price (increase the cost of equity) of securities to 
protect against this behaviour. Both outcomes will have a negative impact on the 
economy. As cost of equity capital increases, corporate investment and economic activity 
decreases. For individual and institutional investors, competitive capital markets facilitate 
the construction of portfolios of diversified securities for specific purposes, such as 
retirement. 
Recognizing the importance of capital markets and the need to keep them current, 
the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (‘IDA’) in June 2005 commissioned 
the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada (the ‘Task Force’). 
The mandate of the Task Force under the Chairmanship of Thomas Allen was to make 
recommendations to modernize securities legislation in Canada that would maintain or 
enhance the competitiveness of Canada’s capital markets while continuing to protect 
individual investors. 
 
The first challenge facing the Task Force was to focus the scope of the analysis since the 
possible areas in which changes could be contemplated were wider than the securities 
area—for example, the role of taxation is crucial. The Task Force limited its investigation 
in a number of dimensions. First, it decided not to duplicate reviews undertaken by 
provincial securities regulators. Second, it limited consideration of the role of self- 
regulatory organizations (SROs) to the enforcement area. Third, although a crucial 
element, it decided that analysis of the regulatory fragmentation in Canada and the issue 
of the national regulator or its alternative, the passport system, would not be part of its 
analysis. 
Fundamental to its deliberations was the recognition of the trade-off between the 
needs of issuers and the importance of protecting retail investors. At one extreme, issuers 
would prefer a situation in which the market was permitted to provide regulatory control. 
However, as academic research has demonstrated,4 there are situation in markets, 
especially in the those dependent on information, in which markets can fail. At the other 
extreme, investor protection can be achieved by tight regulation and extensive disclosure. 
However,  this  comes  at  a  cost  in  terms  of  added  regulatory  costs  to  issuers  and 
constraints on innovation in securities markets. This trade-off has been recognized in 
the analysis undertaken by the Task Force and in its recommendations. 
The Task Force engaged the Capital Markets Institute (CMI) at the Rotman School of 
Management, University of Toronto to act as Research Director. With CMI involvement, 
the Task Force commissioned 30 research papers by leading Canadian and international 
academics and legal practitioners to elicit the most current thinking in securities 
 
regulation and to test whether a number of potential recommendations were worth 
pursuing. More than 40 researchers were engaged in this endeavour and the resulting set 
of research papers is unprecedented in a Canadian study of capital markets. The Task 
Force also obtained written and oral submissions from stakeholders and other interested 
parties. The result of this activity is a set of 65 recommendations in a number of areas. 
The Report was released in October 2006. 
This article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we consider five of the major areas in 
which the Task Force recommendations are found. These include recommendations 
concerning cost–benefit analysis (CBA), improving access to capital markets, the use of 
electronic disclosure systems and financial literacy, the regulation of hedge  funds  and 
finally, enforcement. In Section 3, we review two issues that received significant 
discussion but were left for further study as ideas for consideration. The first concerns 
the  role  of  gatekeepers,  in  particular  securities   analysts.   The   discussion   of   this 
issue reflected, among other influences, reduced analyst  coverage  in  general  and  for 
small firms in particular. The second is insurance for misinformation which is a 
mechanism to reduce investor risk with respect to misinformation in  disclosure.  In 
Section 4, we draw conclusions from the Task Force’s deliberations and 
recommendations. 
We have not referred in any depth to the specific research studies that were 
commissioned by the Task Force. These studies along with the Task Force Report can be 
found on the Task Force and the IDA websites.5 We have provided the recommendations 
in the Appendix to this article. 
 
 
2. Recommendations and discussion 
Cost–Benefit Analysis (Chapter 3 in the Task Force Report6) 
Market forces in a competitive market generally promote behaviours and conditions that 
benefit the market and penalize behaviours that harm the market. It is the role of the 
regulator to step in where market forces do not function perfectly and put the market’s 
integrity  at  risk.  The  Task  Force’s  view  was   that   market   forces   work   best 
when unencumbered, so regulatory intervention should be limited to the least degree 
necessary to solve a market problem. There is little that securities regulators can do in 
a proactive sense to foster competitiveness in the capital markets, but if regulators are 
not careful, there is much that can be done to hinder it. Therefore, the Task Force 
argued that regulators successfully enhance competition by staying out of the way as 
much as possible 
However, there are situations in which regulation is needed either proactively or 
reactively. The policy rationale for intervention in capital markets has always been to 
improve the economic functioning of the markets in situations when markets either have 
not been doing or cannot be expected to do the job properly. This situation is referred 
to as market failure. The Task Force accepted this position but with its emphasis 
on letting the market work when appropriate, it recommended that anticipatory 
regulation be revisited regularly to determine if market forces continue to be unable 
to address the market failure. Further, a concern with an ever deeper intervention led 
to the recommendation that before any new rules were enacted,  regulators 
 
should assess whether stricter enforcement of existing rules would address  the 
market failure. To do this effectively requires the regulator to identify the failure, the 
outcome the rule is intended to achieve and measurements to assess if the objective has 
been achieved. 
The Task Force was also concerned that the introduction of significant new 
regulatory rules be assessed in a disciplined manner to determine if there is a market 
failure, and if the proposed rule will achieve the result in an economically efficient 
manner. The tool recommended for use by all Canadian securities regulators is cost-
benefit analysis (CBA). In CBA, the dollar incremental costs and benefits of a rule are 
assessed and a new (old) rule is accepted (removed) when the benefits exceed (are less 
than) the costs. 
The research paper on CBA reviewed the application of this approach in a number of 
jurisdictions in Canada, in the US and in the UK. Also, some specific examples were 
evaluated. Further the paper discussed a number of conceptual and implementation 
issues. 
The Task Force endorsed the use of CBA and added a number of interesting 
augmentations: 
• To the extent possible, a uniform set of published guidelines should be established outlining the 
methodology to be used in CBA. 
• All CBA should include a clear description of the uncertainties (ie the predictions, assumptions, forecasts, 
etc.) that are associated with the analysis. 
• Third-parties affected by a proposed rule should be encouraged to undertake their own CBA for 
consideration by securities regulators. 
 
• Where a rule is adopted despite evidence that the expected benefits of a new rule are less than the expected 
costs, the securities regulators should be required to explain why they have adopted the rule. Moreover, 
there should be a mandatory re-evaluation of any such rule after a set period of time to ensure that the 
objectives of the rule are still being met. 
The Task Force had two further points about CBA in terms of improving its 
implementation. The first is an ex post CBA conducted by a body independent of the 
group that introduced the regulation. Periodic reviews would be mandatory and could be 
conducted in conjunction with periodic review committees. 
The second is a far reaching recommendation. The Task Force recommended the 
establishment of an independent body with the specific purpose of conducting, at defined 
intervals, a systematic CBA of every significant regulatory intervention into capital 
market activity. The independent body would be staffed by capital markets experts from 
all stakeholder groups. Where the CBA indicated that regulatory intervention was not 
justified, the securities commission would be entitled to preserve the regulation, but only 
by providing an explanation to the public for its disagreement with the independent 
body. The importance of assessing in a disciplined way the introduction of new rules is 
not limited to the Task Force recommendation. In November 2006, the Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation, an independent group analysing the competitiveness of US 
capital markets made the following recommendation: ‘The SEC and SROs should move 
to a more risk-based regulatory process, emphasizing the costs and benefits of new rules. 
In weighing the costs and benefits of new rules, regulators should rely on empirical 
evidence to the extent possible.’7 
Improving access to capital markets 
 
A key driver in the competitiveness of Canada’s capital markets is the speed with which 
issuers are able to access capital. As ease of access to the capital markets increases, the 
number of participants—both issuers and investors—should also increase. Issuers will be 
drawn to a market in which capital can be accessed efficiently and, in turn, investors will 
be drawn with them. Further, access to capital markets should at least be as expeditious as 
found in competing capital markets such as the US. 
A  goal  of  Canadian  capital  markets  regulation  should  be  to  ensure  that,  to  the 
extent consistent with investor protection, the Canadian capital markets can be accessed 
with speed and efficiency that is comparable to, or greater than, other major markets. 
The recommendations in this section relate to ‘follow-on’ prospectus offerings and 
prospectus exempt offerings (ie private placements) by issuers that have already ‘gone 
public’ through initial public offerings. The speed issue centres on the extent to which 
a securities system  should  be  based  on  required  disclosure  and  ex  post  enforcement, 
or conversely, to what extent regulators must intervene on an ex ante basis through 
disclosure  review. 
The current Canadian regime: POP and shelf offerings 
The importance of quick access to the capital markets has long been recognized  by 
Canadian securities regulators. Canadian issuers currently have two methods available to 
execute an expedited public follow-on offering of securities: (i) they can proceed by filing 
a short-form prospectus under the Prompt Offering Qualification System (‘POP system’) 
of National Instrument 44-101—Short Form Prospectus Distributions (‘NI 44-101’); and 
(ii) they can file a shelf prospectus and related prospectus supplement when they decide 
 
to come to market under National Instrument 44-102—Shelf Distributions (‘NI 44-102’). 
 
The POP system 
Under the POP system issuers file a short form prospectus that would make up for its 
brevity by incorporating by reference other disclosure documents, such as an annual 
information form, financial statements and material change reports. The key advantage of 
a short form prospectus is that the relatively short preparation time coupled with the 
abbreviated period for regulatory review permits an issuer to complete a distribution of 
securities in a relatively short timeframe (ie approximately three weeks from inception to 
closing). Less management time is required in preparing the prospectus document, and 
the regulatory review process is substantially shorter than in connection with a traditional 
long-form prospectus. A significant consequence of the POP system’s introduction was 
the willingness of the underwriters to offer to issuers a product called a ‘Bought Deal’, 
under which the underwriters, committed to purchase for resale the  securities  being 
issued, took the risk that, barring extraordinary events, the market might deteriorate 
between the date of the underwriting agreement and the date of closing. This risk was 
acceptable to the underwriter community because the period of exposure to the ‘market 
risk’ was substantially reduced. The ability to offer such a product to issuers in Canada 
has been a significant competitive advantage for the Canadian underwriting community 
and has undoubtedly been a positive factor to enhance the competitiveness of Canada’s 




An issuer that is qualified to file a short form prospectus in a jurisdiction is also qualified 
to file a base shelf prospectus in that jurisdiction. The shelf prospectus is an offering 
document prepared and filed in respect of an aggregate dollar amount of securities, which 
are then put on a metaphorical ‘shelf’ for up to 25 months until the issuer decides to take 
some or all of the qualified securities ‘off the shelf’ to distribute them. The securities 
regulators review base shelf prospectuses as they would review any other short form 
prospectus (typically within three working days of filing). 
At the time of the actual sale, the issuer prepares a shelf prospectus supplement, that is 
often relatively brief, containing only deal-specific information, and disclosure about 
securities being sold that was not available at the time the base shelf prospectus was 
prepared and receipted. The prospectus supplement is not subject to any regulatory 
review at the time of issuance. Typically a distribution under a shelf prospectus 
supplement can be completed in as little as five days. 
 
The unallocated shelf 
While the basic shelf prospectus provides flexibility to issuers because the timing of the 
eventual offering is determined by market or business opportunities that arise within the 
25 month shelf period, the unallocated shelf prospectus provides even greater options 
because it allows qualification of debt, equity and other securities without a specific 
allocation of the aggregate offering amount among the classes of securities being so 
qualified. It is only when an offering is actually made (and upon the preparation and 
filing of the prospectus supplement) that the type and amount of security to be offered 
is fixed. Certain limits are imposed, however, as the prospectus must stipulate the total 
 
dollar value of the securities the issuer proposes to sell under the shelf prospectus, which 
value is to be based upon the amount the issuer reasonably expects to sell within the 25 
month period following the filing. 
 
The US Public Offering Reforms 
In July 2005, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the ‘SEC’) released a wide-
ranging set of rules that will have a profound effect on the public offering process in the 
US8 (the ‘US Public Offering Reforms’). Most of the rules are deregulatory in nature 
and while the reforms affect all registered offerings in the US, the most liberalizing aspects 
are available to large issuers with a reporting history. Among other things, the US Public 
Offering Reforms create a new class of issuer called a ‘well-known seasoned issuer’ 
(‘WKSI’), modify the offering communication rules around the time of registered 
offerings and permit the use of ‘free writing prospectuses’ and, in some cases, eliminate 
the need  to  physically  deliver  a  final  prospectus.  Most  notably,  WKSIs  are  permitted 
to access the US capital markets without SEC  review  of  their  registration  statements. 
Based on the criteria established for WKSI status, about 30 percent of the US listed issuers 
would meet the test for WKSI status.9 
The liberalization of the registration rules and the speed to market afforded to WKSIs 
is predicated on the conclusion that within this category issuers are entitled to special 
treatment since they are most closely watched by the media, analyst community and 
institutional investors. If a company is big enough, has at least a year-long disclosure 
record and has a sufficient number of ‘eyes’ watching it on a constant basis, the SEC is 
 
willing to permit its gatekeeping function (in the form of registration statement review) 
to be partially subsumed by the review undertaken by these other market participants. 
The Task Force was convinced of the appropriateness of this approach and investigated 
whether it could be introduced in the Canadian market 
 
A Canadian Offering Reform Proposal 
Automatic shelf registration under the US Public Offering Reforms for those issuers in 
the WKSI category has allowed for nearly instantaneous access to the US capital markets 
for 30 percent of the US listed companies. In contrast, those Canadian issuers qualified 
to use the POP system (which, after amendments to NI 44-101 in late 2005, covers a vast 
majority of Canadian reporting issuers) and completing a ‘bought deal’ financing 
typically have at least three to five business days until they can confirm sales and begin 
collecting funds for closing. Admittedly, those using a shelf prospectus would have a 
shorter lag. 
The Task Force was convinced of the need for Canadian firms to access the capital 
markets at a speed comparable to their counterparts in the US. After review of a study10 
undertaken to examine the background behind the SEC decision to undertake the WKSI 
route and an analysis of its applicability to Canada, the Task Force recommended that the 
WKSI concept from the US be introduced in Canada; it called the approach Canadian 
well-known seasoned issuers or C-WKSIs. 
The C-WKSI framework encompasses three essential elements: (i) the criteria for an 
issuer to be eligible to use C-WKSI; (ii) the form of offering documentation and (iii) the 
speed advantage of being a C-WKSI. We consider briefly each of these elements. 
 
 
C-WKSI eligibility criteria 
The underlying premise is that C-WKSIs should receive less regulatory scrutiny because 
they are presumed to receive greater market scrutiny. To assess the Canadian eligibility 
threshold level, measured by market capitalization, the Task Force relied on a report by 
Adam Pritchard.11 The US standard was quickly dismissed since it did not accord with 
the existence of more smaller capitalization companies in Canada, and thus the resulting 
set of C-WKSI eligible companies would not meet the Task Force goal of more rapid 
access to capital markets for as many issuers as possible.12 
How low could the market capitalization cut-off be set without unduly risking a lack of 
attention by media, analysts and institutions to issuer disclosure? To determine the 
threshold level Pritchard looked at analyst coverage since this is a good proxy for market 
coverage. He found that analyst coverage ‘remains relatively robust—for those companies 
making offerings—down to the level of $345 million in market capitalization’. A $350 
million cut-off would place nearly 30 percent of TSX issuers in the C-WKSI category 
(using market capitalizations at the end of 2005). Moreover, only 12 issuers on the TSX- 
30 index would be excluded if this standard were imposed. The subsequent Table 1, 
which has been taken from Prof. Pritchard’s study,13 shows analyst coverage at various 
levels of market capitalization based on a sample of 10 randomly chosen companies at 
specified ranges of market capitalization. 
 
C-WKSI offering documentation 
To facilitate speedy access to the capital markets, the Task Force recommended that C-
 
WKSIs be allowed to offer securities to the public using a simple ‘term sheet’ that 
 
Table 1. Analyst coverage  
Market Capitalization Mean number Max/Min number of Number of issuers 
($s in millions) of analysts analysts with no analysts 
1,150–2,300 8.3 16/3 0 
1,000–1,150 7.1 10/2 0 
920–1,000 7.0 12/2 0 
800–920 7.7 13/1 0 
690–800 3.6 9/1 0 
575–690 3.9 10/0 1 
460–575 3.7 9/0 3 
345–460 5.8 11/1 0 
230–345 2.5 5/0 2 
85–230 3.2 6/0 2 
Overall 5.3 16/0 8 
 
 
summarizes the material terms of the securities being offered. For a  seasoned  issuer 
coming to market, its securities trade with  the  benefit  of  full  disclosure  of  material 
facts as at the date of the issuer’s last annual information form and with the benefit 
of full disclosure of material changes up to the date in question. When the issuer 
comes to market the disclosure record  will  be  augmented  by  a  short  form  prospectus  
which will contain details of the offering, any consequent disclosure, such as use of 
proceeds (as expansive or cursory as may  be  appropriate),  together  with  such  additional 
information as the issuer and the  underwriters  believe  is  required  to  be  disclosed. 
This  offering  document  would  not   be   subject   to   regulatory   review   in   advance. 
The scrutiny of such an issuer by other market intermediaries would be regarded as 
sufficient. On an ex post basis, any issuer whose  disclosure  was  inadequate  could  be 
denied  C-WKSI  status. 
 
The C-WKSI speed advantage 
 
To ensure that speed be generated for the C-WKSI approach it is necessary to address 
the underwriter’s requirement of due diligence, which is usually a time-consuming 
exercise, with the issuer’s desire to access to the capital markets as quickly as possible—a 
difficulty that is common even under the POP system. To address the impediment to 
quick access, the Task Force concluded that the underwriter’s certificate for C-WKSI 
offerings should reflect commercial reality—achieving speed to market sometimes 
means that something less than full-blown due diligence—and this fact should be 
acceptable to the regulatory system. The result is an underwriter certificate that talks 
about ‘a review that is reasonable under the circumstances’. Note that this approach 
shifts a portion of the gatekeeping function played by the underwriter in its pre-offering 
due diligence review to the research analysts, media and institutional investors following 
the disclosures of a C-WKSI on a daily basis. 
 
Private placements 
Broadening the ‘accredited investor’ category 
Another method issuers can use to access the capital markets is to ‘privately place’ 
securities using a prospectus exemption. For individuals, the most commonly  used 
private placement exemption is the ‘accredited investor’ exemption. By measure  of 
wealth, an accredited investor is regarded as being sufficiently financially sophisticated 
(or to be able to afford  sophisticated  advice)  to  purchase  securities  without  a 
prospectus.14 
The Task Force was concerned that a large number of investors are shut out of the 
 
private placement market because of the size of their personal fortunes and 
recommended that the category of individual regarded as an accredited investor be 
broadened to include not only those who are wealthy, but also those who rely on 
a registered adviser in making  their  decision  to  invest  in  the  private  placement. 
The financial sophistication of the registered adviser, which comes from professional 
training and accreditation, would be transposed onto his client.15 This recommendation 
would increase the investor base. 
Broadening the class of eligible investors as recommended could increase the risk of 
unduly eroding the entire prospectus model. For this reason the Task Force 
recommended that, at the outset, this exemption be limited to 50 investors for any 
one private placement. Over time, consideration should be given to increasing  the 
number of permitted investors who qualify under this exemption. 
Other limits to the recommendation are as follows: 
• The issuer must be a ‘reporting issuer’ (or the equivalent) under securities laws. 
• The registered adviser would be prohibited from advertising to encourage investors to rely on this 
exemption and sales under this exemption would only be permitted to clients with whom the registered 
adviser had a pre-existing relationship. 
 
Electronic Disclosure and Financial Literacy (Chapter 4) 
The Task Force focused on numerous questions related to investor decision making 
such as: 
• How do investors make investment decisions? 
• Is the form of presentation of public company disclosure adequate for investors’ needs, to enable sound 
investment decisions to be made? 
 
• What opportunity does an investor have to take reasonable steps to be informed prior to investing? 
How do investors make investment decisions? First, the Task Force recognized that, 
while theoretical models assume that an investor is a person with unlimited ability to 
consider and access relevant information, filter out unwanted information and measure 
motives of all parties, in reality the typical retail investor falls far short of this ideal. 
Second, the Task Force appreciated that much of what is required to be disclosed under 
securities laws is difficult to digest. Although a high percentage of investors will consult 
an issuer’s prospectus,16 the dense technical language, sheer length of the document, 
jargon and volume of information easily results in information overload.17 Keeping these 
points in mind, the Task Force focused on recommendations that increase the 
effectiveness of disclosure (as opposed to simply concentrating on volumes of 
information). 
In attempting to increase the effectiveness of disclosure, the Task Force focused on 
the method by which information is communicated. There has been a movement to 
mandate the use of  ‘plain language’ in  disclosure documents  (more so in  other 
jurisdictions18 than  in  Canada19). However, the challenge  is ensuring  that ‘plain’ 
disclosure is also ‘full disclosure’. The tendency has been to err on the side of full 
disclosure and this pragmatic choice is based on the fact that many investors have the 
assistance of an expert to clarify complex disclosure. The Task Force recognized the 
danger of putting too much emphasis on plain disclosure and would prefer to direct 
regulatory focus on presenting information more effectively. 
The current regulatory regime requires that a document be (i) made available for 
 
public review and posted on the internet accessible System for Electronic Document 
Analysis and Retrieval (‘SEDAR’) (such a process being known as ‘filing’) and 
(ii) physically delivered by a reporting issuer to security holders or prospective investors 
(such a process being known as ‘delivery’). While National Policy 11-201—Delivery of 
Documents by Electronic Means provides guidance on electronic delivery of certain 
disclosure documents, the Task Force’s view was that the policy’s potential to reduce the 
burden of paper delivery was muted because of the requirement that paper delivery be 
reverted to in many instances. 
SEDAR was created by the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). Filings with 
SEDAR started on 1 January 1997, and are now mandatory for most reporting issuers in 
Canada. SEDAR was a significant step in streamlining the filing of disclosure documents 
in that it has saved time and created a free and publicly accessible record of all disclosure 
documents. However, the Task Force has recommended some improvements to SEDAR 
including expanding its search capabilities and refining the category of document 
classification rather than relying on a catch-all category of ‘Other Documents’. 
Although there are some guidelines regarding the electronic delivery of documents 
(as opposed to filings under SEDAR), the potential of realizing electronic efficiency has 
been muted by the requirement that paper delivery be reverted to in many instances.20 
Keeping in mind the strengths of SEDAR, as a free, publicly accessible full record of 
disclosure documents, the Task Force focused on determining the most effective method 
of delivery. The Task Force cited statistics indicating that e-literacy is prevalent among 
most investors and that the number of investors who are not e-literate would not be 
 
significant in number.21 
With this in mind, the Task Force recommended that Canada should make the leap to 
‘access equals delivery’. ‘Access equals delivery’ means, quite simply, that the regulatory 
requirement to deliver a disclosure document to an investor will be  satisfied  by  the 
investor being able to access that document using the internet.  For example, under an 
‘access equals delivery’ model, the posting of a disclosure document on SEDAR would 
satisfy both the filing and delivery requirements imposed by securities laws. There would 
be no requirement for paper delivery of disclosure  documents  to  investors.  The  Task 
Force noted that paper production is extremely expensive and that to permit a  few 
investors to demand paper disclosure, and thereby impose a cost on all shareholders of 
the issuer would largely thwart the cost savings of shifting to an ‘access equals delivery’ 
model. Investors would be able to print hard copies of documents on their own. Those 
investors that are e-illiterate could seek the assistance of their registered representative to 
obtain  hard  copies  of  the  documents. 
With respect to implementing ‘access equals delivery’, the Task Force addressed the 
potential hurdle of obtaining consent of investors to have electronic delivery. Its position 
was that this hurdle should be removed not jumped. Consent should be implied in the 
decision to invest in a system where ‘access equals delivery’ is the accepted medium of 
information dissemination. Accordingly, the Task Force recommended that all delivery 
requirements be abolished and that all disclosure documents be required to be filed on 
SEDAR. The elimination of ‘delivery’ would render investor consent to ‘access equals 
delivery’ unnecessary. 
 
In looking towards the future, the Task Force considered the possible use of new tech- 
nology. One idea that has met with a great deal of enthusiasm has been the US Securities 
Exchange Commission’s voluntary programme for reporting financial information using 
Extensible Business Reporting Language (‘XBRL’). XBRL allows for the ‘tagging’ of data 
items in a disclosure document, ie information is embedded in the text of a document 
which allows it to be identified by the computer—for example, the general and administra- 
tive expense line in a balance sheet would have its own unique tag. This allows the data to 
become ‘alive’ for the user. In January 2007, Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) 
announced the establishment of a programme that would allow issuers to voluntary file 
financial statements in XBRL format.22 The purpose of the programme is to assist 
Canadian capital markets participants to gain practical knowledge and experience in 
preparing, filing and using XBRL information. The voluntary programme will also help the 
CSA assess the usefulness of XBRL as it considers whether to make filing in this format a 
requirement. 
Another important point would be the move towards ‘layered disclosure’. ‘Layered’ 
electronic disclosure would, in layer one, present a basic summary of the information to 
be communicated to the investor. The reader would then have the option to ‘click’ on a 
piece of information that is of particular interest and enter additional ‘layers’, each with 
an increased level of detail. An additional advantage of electronic ‘layering’ will be the 
ability to ‘pull’ information from existing data sources. Computer and internet experts 
consulted by the Task Force have indicated that the technology necessary to implement 
the Task Force’s recommendation is readily available and the Task Force named its design 
 
‘MERIT’—Model for Effective Regulatory Information Transfer.23 The Task Force has 
recommended that serious consideration be given to the implementation of MERIT and 
XBRL technology. Until such time that MERIT has been adopted, it was recommended 
that paper-based disclosure be presented in layered format with each layer being of 
increasing depth and complexity, thereby allowing investors to determine the depth of 
disclosure which is informative for them. 
Finally, given that an increasing number of Canadians are now responsible for 
managing their own retirement accounts, there is a renewed importance to investor 
education in addition to disclosure. It has also been noted that increasing levels of 
financial literacy also function to enhance the competitiveness of Canada’s capital 
markets by increasing liquidity. However, there are indicators that a staggering two-thirds 
of Canadians are functionally illiterate when it comes to investment knowledge.24 
Although there have been investor education initiatives undertaken by members of the 
CSA, the Task Force noted that a national mandate would be required to sustain an 
education programme would be effective on a broad level. Accordingly, the Task Force 
recommended financial literacy be treated as a matter of national priority and that 
a national coordinator of public and private sector education initiatives be created. 
Hedge Funds (Chapter 6) 
Hedge funds have demonstrated both large growth and significant controversy around 
the globe. Overall the Canadian hedge fund industry is estimated to include about 
$26.6 billion in assets under management with approximately $10 billion invested by 
Canadian pension funds, $14.1 billion by Canadian individuals ($6.4 billion in stand- 
 
alone hedge funds and funds of hedge funds and $7.7 billion in ‘principal protected 
notes’) and $1.6 billion by foreign clients of Canadian hedge fund managers. While there 
has been growth in Canadian hedge funds they are smaller than hedge funds in the rest 
of the world. For example, nearly 30 percent of the hedge funds in Canada have assets 
under management in the range of $10–$49 billion, whereas only 10 percent of global 
hedge funds have assets in this range. Further, only 4 percent of the Canadian hedge 
funds have assets in excess of $5 billion whereas global hedge funds have 21 percent 
reporting assets larger than $5 billion.25 
However, fewer assets do not translate into a lack of concerns; there have been a 
number of hedge fund problems. Two of the more recent hedge fund blow-ups in Canada 
were reviewed for the task force.26 The researcher concluded that their failure was not a 
problem of inadequate regulation. The investment strategies were complicated and 
monies were not invested as indicated in the offering documents but used to  pay 
operating expenses, including performance fees. The author also concludes that 
‘enhanced regulatory oversight through a timely investigation or examination into the 
business and affairs of these companies would likely have revealed a handful of significant 
issues in the operations of these companies that could have led to an earlier discovery of 
what actually was going on . .  .’.27 The problems associated with hedge funds have 
resulted in increased attention by regulators across the world. 
There are many benefits that accrue to investors and the economy from a vibrant 
hedge fund industry. These include better liquidity in capital markets; expanded choices 
for investors to construct more effective portfolios; and improved market efficiency. 
 
These factors improve the competitiveness of capital markets. Part of the improvement 
is an increased ease of investors, both retail and institutional, to access these funds. 
In addition, hedge funds represent a valuable pool of capital market talent which should 
be fostered and not discouraged from conducting legitimate operations in Canada. 
However, concerns continue to exist regarding hedge funds and not just in the case of 
the extreme event of bankruptcy. These concerns are related to the structure of the hedge 
funds and include the following: valuation of hedge fund assets in strategies where 
underlying assets do not have liquid markets; effectiveness of internal control systems; 
lack of understanding of investment strategies by investors; incentives for fraud; and 
inadequate disclosure of fees, expenses and potential for conflicts of interest. Increasing 
competitiveness requires that investors be comfortable with investing in the securities and 
that hedge fund issuers/managers have the ability to generate products. 
Hedge funds in Canada are generally organized in one of the three commercial 
structures: (i) stand-alone hedge funds, (ii) funds of hedge funds and (iii) principal 
protected notes. A principal protected note is a form of ‘structured’ investment product 
which derives its value based on the movement of an underlying investment, such as, but 
not exclusively, a hedge fund. ‘Principal protected notes’ guarantee that at maturity the 
principal amount of the investors’ investment will be returned. 
The major banks were the first to issue structured products in Canada. In 2002, 
independent (ie non-bank) managers began to structure and distribute principal 
protected notes, using hedge funds (usually funds of hedge funds) as the underlying 
investment. Independent managers of principal protected notes work in partnership with 
 
banks (or Crown Corporation) to structure these financial instruments. The notes are 
sponsored and distributed by the manager but issued by the bank (or Crown 
Corporation). As of March 2005, it is estimated that 24 percent of the principal 
protected note market was structured with a hedge fund as the underlying investment. 
Current regulatory regime 
Exempt trades 
The distribution of securities in hedge funds, like the distribution of other securities in 
Canada, must be completed using a prospectus or in reliance on a prospectus exemption. 
There have been few (if any) hedge fund offerings by way of prospectus in Canada—few 
hedge fund managers are inclined to voluntarily make the detailed disclosure required in 
a prospectus and the subsequent continuous disclosure rules upon the hedge fund 
becoming a reporting issuer. Thus, investors in hedge funds are limited to those who 
meet the definition of ‘accredited investor’ under NI 45-106 or who have the means to 
invest more than $150,000—ie wealthy Canadians. 
Exempt securities 
The distribution of all principal protected notes is an important exemption to the earlier 
noted process. These products are typically structured as an ‘evidence of deposit’ such 
that they fall outside of the legislative framework that applies to publicly traded securities 
and mutual funds. The returns on such notes are sometimes linked to the performance of 
hedge funds or funds of funds that themselves are not reporting issuers offering securities 
by prospectus. Thus, retail investors can buy a hedge fund which is sold both without a 
prospectus and to investors who are not deemed wealthy or sophisticated by securities 
 
legislation. 
Current regulation generates an ill-advised and contradictory result. On one hand, 
direct investments in hedge funds are generally limited to those investors qualifying to 
purchase an exempt security, ie the wealthy. At the same time, however, any investor 
(regardless of wealth) is permitted to purchase principal protected notes with an 
underlying hedge fund, via the ‘backdoor’ without the full protections afforded by 
securities laws because principal protected notes are regarded not as securities or as 
exempt securities. 
Regulatory recommendations 
Regulating hedge funds may actually increase market participation. The Task Force 
recommendations started from the premises that hedge fund investing represents a viable 
and attractive alternative investment strategy and that innovation should not be stifled. 
This trade-off needs to be examined carefully and the Task Force strongly recommended 
that any changes be subject to a CBA. 
The Task Force’s recommendations pertaining to hedge funds were designed to 
establish a regulatory framework that would permit hedge funds to be widely sold to the 
public. To this end, retail investors need to be able to access all of  the  information 
necessary to make informed investment decisions regarding hedge funds and principal 
protected notes linked to hedge funds. The regulatory recommendations were in the areas 
of disclosure,  principal  protected notes and regulation of managers. 
Disclosure 
The features of the disclosure regime are as follows: 
 
• Full disclosure of all performance, management, administrative, referral and other fees (including the 
compensation of the investment adviser and manager). 
• A description of the relationship between the hedge fund manager, adviser, administrator and prime 
broker, and appropriate cautionary language regarding any conflicts of interest between them. 
• Mandatory disclosure of any ‘side letter’ and other collateral agreements between the hedge fund and 
investors who receive special fee or liquidity arrangements. 
• An independent process or mechanism to value the assets of the hedge fund. 
• A description of the hedge fund structure and its investment strategies. 
• In the case of principal protected note products linked to hedge funds, a full description of the underlying 
hedge fund or fund of a hedge fund incorporating all of the features listed earlier. 
• A custodian or custodian-like capability be required at each hedge fund. 
Principal protected notes linked to hedge funds 
Two recommendations were made to try to ensure that retail investors purchasing 
principal protected notes linked to hedge funds are afforded some protection. 
First the distribution of principal protected notes where the economic value is based 
upon an underlying hedge fund should be regulated according to the nature of the 
underlying investment rather than the exemption accorded to the principal protected 
note with which the underlying investment is ‘wrapped’. 
Second, all financial intermediaries selling hedge fund products and other structured 
products linked to an underlying hedge fund should be required to meet certain 
proficiency requirements to ensure that they properly understand the products they are 
selling. 
Manager registration 
Hedge funds are particularly vulnerable to operational risks associated with poor 
 
management. Despite this, many hedge fund managers (unlike advisers, in Canada) are 
not registrants under securities legislation, and therefore escape regulatory oversight. 
Accordingly, there is no safeguard in place to ensure that a hedge fund manager has 
adequate capitalization, appropriate internal controls or, at the most basic level, whether 
the manager’s principals are fit to manage investors’ money. 
Accordingly, the Task Force recommended that consideration be given to the 
registration of hedge fund managers in order to ensure that there is an appropriate level 
of regulatory oversight of the activities of the manager as well as its capitalization and 
governance procedures. While recognizing that a similar proposal requiring hedge fund 
managers to register as advisers in the US was met with resistance and, ultimately, judicial 
intervention, the Task Force did not believe that these events should forestall 
consideration of its recommendation. 
Subsequent  to  the  release  of  the  Task  Force  report,  the  Canadian  Securities 
Administrators, a council of provincial and territorial securities regulators that 
coordinates and harmonizes regulation for the Canadian capital markets released the 
results of its review of hedge funds in Canada. Many of the same topics were identified, 
including the registration of fund managers. 
 
Enforcement (Chapter 7) 
For many investors, a key question is the extent to which existing Canadian securities 
laws are enforced. Enforcement was relevant to the Task Force because it relates to the 
enhancement of the competitiveness of Canadian capital markets. As was mentioned in 
the Report, international investors may attach a ‘Canadian risk premium’ when investing 
 
in Canadian equities. Vigorous enforcement may enhance the credibility of Canadian 
securities regulation and, in turn, help attract risk adverse investors to Canadian markets. 
Research commissioned by the Task Force supports the conclusion that enforcement of 
securities laws reduces the cost of capital and in turn increases liquidity in the capital 
markets.28 
Although it is clear that improvement to enforcement of Canadian securities laws is 
required, the Task Force was also appreciative of the  unique  attributes  of  Canadian 
capital markets and that, correspondingly, enforcement policy should also be guided by 
such unique attributes as well as Canada’s legal traditions. Enforcement successes in the 
US should not prompt us to transplant US enforcement practices without regard to 
Canadian circumstances. Thus, the Task Force commissioned  research  from  The 
honourable Peter Cory and Prof. Marilyn Pilkington29 (the ‘Cory and Pilkington Report’ 
which will be discussed later) to look into questions such as public concerns about 
enforcement, public policy goals, procedural issues, the balance between  public  and 
private  enforcement  and  the  balance  between  regulatory  and  criminal  enforcement.30 
There was concern that the ‘contrary to the public interest’ provision in securities 
legislation may be abused as a basis of sanctioning market behaviour where there were no 
previous indications that such behaviour was viewed by regulatory authorities to be 
offensive (so-called ‘gotcha enforcement’). The Task Force recommended that the 
‘contrary to the public interest’ provisions be used sparingly and, if the criticized 
behaviour has not been publicly identified in the past, the provision should only be used 
to discipline egregious behaviour. The Task Force suggested that if an offensive pattern of 
 
behaviour is identified, it should be addressed clearly in a regulatory notice; this notice 
would advise market participants that such conduct, if continued, would be considered 
contrary to the public interest and sanctioned appropriately. 
Due to the geographical proximity of the US, Canadian enforcement is invariably 
compared to that of the US. The high visibility of securities law enforcement action in the 
US has led many Canadian investors (justifiably or not) to conclude that Canadian 
regulators are failing in this area. However, it is important to understand the difficulties 
in trying to make a useful comparison between the enforcement activities in the two 
countries. This is not to say that such a comparison has no utility. Rather, the issues 
central to such a comparison must be understood. 
Thus, the Task Force commissioned research to draw comparisons between Canadian 
and US enforcement systems.31 Professor Howell Jackson compared the budgets and 
staffing levels for securities regulators in the US and Canada, collected data on 
enforcement activity in Canada and followed that with a comparison of enforcement 
activity between US and Canada. Professor Jackson found that: 
• When adjusted for population, GDP or market capitalization, the levels of Canadian supervisory budgets 
and staffing levels do not seem wildly out of line and may actually be more intensive than the US. 
• However, Canadian regulatory budgets per staff member are lower than their counterparts in the US, with 
the US budgets per staff member being about 60 percent higher. He does not believe that there is evidence 
that more Canadian personnel are needed though one may wish to revisit the issue of budget levels. 
• For the years 2002–2004, Canadian public enforcement activity was much lower than that of the US even 
when one performed scaling adjustments. However, more recent data indicates that, given plausible scaling 
factors, Canadian public enforcement is roughly comparable to the US (though private enforcement is still 
much lower). Nevertheless, Prof. Jackson cautions that drawing comparisons is difficult since one could 
 
compare based on many different factors such as number of actions, level of market capitalization, 
monetary fines imposed, etc. 
• Overall, in the past few years there has been some volatility in Canadian sanctioning practices with an 
upward trend. Professor Jackson notes that more work needs to be done to understand whether the trends 
are temporary or permanent. 
• Private enforcement is substantially less in Canada, but Prof. Jackson cautions against moving towards a 
US system of class actions as there are many reasons to believe that this form of the US litigation system is 
inefficient and inequitable. 
The Task Force was greatly assisted by the Cory and Pilkington Report and, for the 
most part,  found  itself  in  agreement  with  the  recommendations  contain  therein. 
A summary of the recommendations is as follows:32 
• Priorities and performance: securities regulators and enforcement agencies should establish a set of 
priorities and regularly evaluate whether enforcement has attained stated objectives. 
• Investigation: A study should be conducted to assess needs for police services in investigation of capital 
market crimes and the various contributions to be made by municipal, provincial and federal police 
services. Integrated Market Enforcement Teams (‘IMET’) should continuously develop and maintain 
expertise  required  to  conduct  complex  capital  market  offence  investigations.  The  IMET  should  be 
expanded to conduct all necessary investigations or the capacity of other police forces should be enhanced 
in order to address the cases not addressed by the IMET. Within each IMET and securities regulator there 
should be a Senior Independent Review Officer (a ‘SIRO’) to provide focus, supervision and accountability 
for strategic decisions in an investigation. The SIRO would have a status similar to a Securities 
Commissioner and such persons might be found among the senior ranks of counsel in private practice or 
the prosecution service. In particular, they may be found among individuals recently retired who remain at 
the peak of performance, and can bring their abilities and experience to bear. 
• Prosecution: The SIRO should have independent authority to determine whether a matter should be sent 
for a hearing by a securities tribunal or for prosecution as a provincial offence. It may be appropriate, 
 
where a provincial prosecution has been authorized, to authorize counsel retained or employed by the 
securities regulator to prosecute it. 
• Adjudication: The adjudicative functions of securities commissions should be transferred to independent 
tribunals composed of individuals with expert knowledge of law, procedure and the operation of capital 
markets. The National Judicial Institute should prepare judges in the adjudication of complex capital 
market offences. Finally, the Task Force has recommended the creation of a separate capital markets court 
to which jurisdiction, both provincial and federal, is ceded. Such a court would have jurisdiction over all 
capital market regulatory offences.33 
• Penalties and orders: Legislatures should consider enacting laws similar to section 380 of the Criminal Code 
of Canada, specifying the aggravating circumstances that must be taken into account in imposing a 
sentence for offences under securities legislation and the non-mitigating factors that must not be taken 
into account. Penalties and orders should be harmonized across the country yet applied with regional 
sensitivity. Provisions governing costs should be reviewed, considering best practices of other jurisdictions, 
and harmonized. 
• Redress for investors: Securities regulators should consider applying to court more frequently for 
restitution, compensation and damages on behalf of aggrieved persons. Consideration should be given to 
authorizing security tribunals as well as courts (adjudicating under provincial or criminal legislations) to 
order compensation or restitution under a fair set of rules. 
• Self-regulatory organizations (SROs): The roles and jurisdiction of SROs should be reviewed. Such a review 
would consider, with respect to SROs, the applicability of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, powers to 
obtain documents and call witnesses, immunity from civil liability and applications for a court monitor. 
• National management of enforcement: Regardless of whether Canada adopts a unified or harmonized 
approach to securities regulation, it is fundamentally important that enforcement be managed on a 
national basis to ensure the effective use of resources, the development and deployment of expert skill and 
knowledge across the country, and the independence and accountability of enforcement processes. 
 
3. Areas for future consideration 
 
The Role of Gatekeepers (Chapter 8) 
Capital markets rely on gatekeepers. Gatekeepers such as auditors, securities analysts, 
credit rating agencies, lawyers and investment banking firms all play a significant 
gatekeeping role in assisting issuers in raising funds and/or maintaining a market. 
Securities analysts have recently been the focus of criticism, particularly because of their 
significant ratio of buy to sell recommendations (sometimes computed in the US at levels 
as high as 100–1), their perceived bias towards optimism, and their willingness, in some 
instances, to endorse the stocks of underwriting clients even when they had personal 
misgivings. Although there has been significant US and Canadian reform, recent research 
suggests that such reform may not have been that effective given the persistence of 
high ratios of buy- to- sell recommendations. Even worse, recent reforms have been costly 
and have led to a drastic reduction in the employment of securities analysts.34 
Securities analysts are currently caught in many conflicts. The  analyst  presumably 
knows that his or her utility to their firm comes from the revenues  that  the  analyst 
indirectly generates for the firm; thus, the firm’s clients cannot safely be offended. 
Conflicts include personal conflicts (eg analyst owning the stock that is being analysed), 
brokerage commission conflicts (buy recommendations tend to generate more 
commissions for the analyst’s employer), investment banking conflicts (there is a 
tendency to inflate the ratings of a firm’s clients), issuer access conflicts (even if the issuer 
is not a client, issuers tend to release information only to ‘friendly analysts’) as well as buy 
side conflicts. Some studies also suggest that analysts tend to ‘herd’ such that most 
analysts refrain from straying far from a consensus prediction of other analysts. 
 
Despite the problems with analyst research it is unsatisfactory to accept that the choice 
is between conflicted research and no research. Past attempts to diminish  investment 
banking personnel from influencing analyst compensation as well as attempts to shield 
analysts from pressure and retaliation do not seem to have succeeded in addressing the 
problem. A possible escape from this  trade-off  between  adequate  coverage  and 
meaningful independence is to create a subsidy  for  research  that  insulates  the  analyst 
from the control of conflicted persons. Justifications for this include (i) securities 
research is a ‘public good’, the private market cannot supply it adequately; (ii) broker- 
dealers today have less freedom to control securities research, they cannot earn the same 
profits from it as in the past and so have reduced their funding for securities research 
within their firm and (iii) securities research has long focused on those stocks that trade 
the most heavily, but the Canadian market is characterized by a preponderance of small 
capitalization stocks. Furthermore, it has been suggested that Canadian exchanges could 
require that no company can trade without at least one analyst. The exchanges could hire 
analysts for ‘uncovered’ companies (passing on the costs to its members and listed 
companies). Such an approach could be more objective and neutral since it would be the 
exchange appointing the analyst as well as more efficient since the exchange may be able 
to take advantage of economies of scale in hiring analysts. The Task Force did not go so 
far as to list subsidized research analysis as one of its 65 recommendations, but thought it 
was a fruitful proposal for reflection and consideration by capital markets stakeholders. 
 
Insurance Against Misinformation (Chapter 9) 
 
As in any economic endeavour, innovation is a key driver of success. In the capital market 
context, success is measured in terms of liquidity and capital using the markets. 
This success requires institutions and regulation that encourage innovation while 
protecting  investors.  Examples  of  these  innovations  include  the  creation  of  the 
Alternative Investment Market  and the Nominated Adviser (NOMAD)35 concept  in the 
UK and the introduction of the ‘well-known seasoned issuer’ concept in the US. The Task 
Force was of the opinion that Canada needs to embrace innovation not for its own sake 
but  to  encourage  competition. 
The Task Force was cognizant that its recommendations to modernize Canadian 
capital markets are by and large evolutionary, a process that entails building on what is 
already in place and attempting to make it better. The Task Force had no qualms in 
pointing this out. 
Nonetheless, the Task Force wondered whether it was time for the introduction of 
a  bold,  innovative  step  as  a  means  of  distinguishing  Canada’s  capital  markets. 
The  innovation  is  the  introduction  of  insurance  against  misinformation  loss  in  the 
capital markets. To this end the Task Force commissioned two research papers. The first 
paper was conceptual and looked at the cost and benefits of potential insurance designs.36 
The second paper addressed the question of whether such insurance could be priced and 
hence offered using an actuarial perspective.37  This paper took an actuarial perspective. 
Risk in capital markets is pervasive and ranges from market risk and firm-specific risk 
related to the specific operations of the firm. However, there is another source of risk that 
investors face—misinformation risk, referred to in the report as ‘behavioural risk’. This 
 
risk is the result of the behaviour of management and is manifest in events in which there 
is  inadequate,  inaccurate  and  untimely  disclosure  of  information  to  the  market.  While 
insurance schemes currently exist in capital markets (eg bank deposit insurance, investor 
protection funds), the insurance scheme against misinformation is unique. Its purpose is 
to  tell  investors  that  subject  to  the  dollar  limits  of  the  programme,  if  you  choose  to 
participate  in  the  Canadian  equity  markets,  there  will  not  be  a  loss  of  funds  due  to 
misinformation  events.  This  approach  is  in  contrast  to  the  current  protection  investors 
have through the impact on behavioural risk by securities law and enforcement and the 
possible recovery after protracted proceedings in the event of a misinformation event. 
A second, market-related solution to the problem is an indirect one and arises through 
the construction  of well-diversified portfolios. While there is some question of the 
diversifiability of this type of event it is clear from the research undertaken by the Task 
Force that retail investors do not hold diversified portfolios, and hence are subject to the 
impact of this risk. 
In thinking about the insurance programme, the Task Force posed two fundamental 
questions: (i) would such a programme be a net benefit to investors? and (ii) could such a 
programme be beneficial in enhancing the competitiveness of Canada’s capital markets? 
Both of the research reports addressed these questions. Professor Baker, after expressing 
some concern over the need for a new insurance programme for misinformation events, 
argued that a securities misinformation programme had the potential to provide systemic 
benefits to the Canadian capital market for two reasons. First, the programme would 
improve compliance with securities laws resulting from cost internalization by issuers and 
governance efforts by the securities misinformation insurance programme; second, there 
 
would be enhanced investor confidence in the Canadian capital market from the 
signalling effect of what amounts to a warranty of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements. Professor Panjer states that the idea of an investor protection programme 
is to protect investors in order to develop greater confidence in the securities market. The 
greater confidence in an insured market enhances its competitiveness by differentiating 
Canadian markets from uninsured markets. 
We have chosen not to present the specifics of the alternative insurance programme 
design schemes along with the associated issues of funding and costs (eg Who can make a 
claim? Against whom can a claim be made and for what damage? How would the 
program be funded?). While interesting, these discussions can be accessed by the 
interested reader. Our purpose is to identify the major reasons for the program and how 
it could achieve its policy purpose of distinguishing Canadian capital markets from 
others, thereby improving Canadian capital market competitiveness. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The idea that capital markets are crucial to an economy’s functioning is uncontestable. 
Regulators around the world are considering how their capital markets can maintain or 
improve their functioning in a world in which there is increased competition for capital. 
Recently the SEC proposed rule changes to increase the attractiveness and competitive- 
ness of the US capital markets following on the increased costs of complying with section 
404 and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. In addition, the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation, an independent group of stakeholders in the US capital markets, was formed 
 
in September 2006. Its mandate was to conduct a major study of how to improve the 
competitiveness of the US public capital markets. It released its first report in November 
2006.38 
The Task Force considered what Canada’s capital markets, and their regulation, would 
look like if its recommendations were adopted. The picture relating to the 
recommendations we considered in this article could look like this: 
• The alternatives for investment diversification, or concentration, would be thoroughly explained to 
investors by qualified investment advisers who would disclose the comparative costs of available options. 
Investment advisers recommending specialized investment products would be qualified to give that advice 
by virtue of product-specific education. 
• Investors wishing to be  informed prior to an investment decision would be attracted to disclosure 
presented in a user-friendly manner, readily able to be penetrated and absorbed at varying levels of 
complexity, to suit their needs and abilities. 
• Senior issuers would have immediate access to the market to raise capital without the delay of regulatory 
oversight of their offering document. 
• Regulators, consequentially, would be able to focus their attention in areas where external gatekeepers are 
less common and less central to the regulatory system. 
• Issuers would benefit from the savings which would result from the end of the ‘paper world’, accepting the 
reality of the ‘e-world’ being today’s disclosure medium for virtually all investment products. 
• It would be commonly regarded as a serious mistake in judgment to contravene Canada’s securities 
laws, due to a focused and effective enforcement system—particularly due to the recommendations to 
invigorate the investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in the securities law enforcement 
system. 
• Lastly, as a result of the foregoing, the ‘made in Canada’ discount might become a ‘made in Canada’ 
premium and the competitiveness of Canada’s markets would be markedly enhanced. 
 
Having met its mandate and goal, the Task Force concluded that it is now up to the 
regulators, legislators and others to determine to what extent this vision is achieved. 
 
Appendix 
Summary of Task Force recommendations 
Recommendations regarding approaches to securities regulation and 
general principles 
1. The Task Force recommends that Canadian securities legislation include as one of its 
purposes the enhancement of the competitiveness of Canada’s capital markets. 
2. The Task Force recommends that rules that are enacted in anticipation of a market 
failure be revisited on a regular basis to determine whether market forces are able to 
address the issue in the absence of regulatory intervention. 
3. The Task Force recommends that prior to enacting new rules to address a market 
failure, a thorough and systematic review of existing rules should be undertaken to 
determine whether, if enforced, existing rules are adequate. This requires that the 
regulator clearly define the failure that is to be addressed and the outcome which the 
rule is intended to produce, including identifying measurements to be used to 
determine whether the failure has been addressed adequately. 
4. The Task Force recommends that all securities regulators in Canada undertake 
empirical cost–benefit analyses prior to the introduction of a significant new rule. 
5. The Task Force recommends that a uniform set of published guidelines be established 
outlining the methodology to be used in cost–benefit analyses. 
 
6. The Task Force recommends that each cost–benefit analysis include a clear description 
of the uncertainties (ie the predictions, assumptions, forecasts, etc. that have been 
applied) that are associated with the analysis. 
7. The Task Force recommends that third-parties affected by a proposed rule be 
encouraged to undertake their own cost–benefit analysis for consideration by securities 
regulators. 
8. The Task Force recommends that where regulations are adopted despite evidence 
that their expected benefits are less than the expected costs, securities regulators be 
required to explain why they have adopted the rule. Moreover, there should be a 
mandatory re-evaluation of such rules after a set period of time to ensure that the 
objectives of the rule are still being met. 
9. The Task Force recommends that an independent body, staffed by capital markets 
experts from all stakeholder groups, be established for the specific purpose of 
conducting, at defined intervals, a systematic cost–benefit analysis of every 
significant regulatory intervention into capital market activity. 
10. The Task Force recommends that Canadian securities regulation be based on clearly 
enunciated regulatory principles which do not need a detailed set of interventionist 
rules for sound implementation. 
11. The Task Force recommends that regulation be scaled according to the size of an 
issuer’s market capitalization and other issuer-specific considerations in order to 
ensure that regulation is appropriate. 
 
 
Recommendations regarding understanding how investors make 
investment decisions and better meeting the needs of investors 
12. The Task Force encourages securities regulators to work to make disclosure 
documents more effective by improving the method by which information is made 
available to investors to enhance the penetrability and comprehensibility of that 
information. 
13. The Task Force recommends that: 
• the search features of SEDAR be expanded to allow for more detailed searches of disclosure 
documents, and 
• the taxonomy for disclosure documents filed on SEDAR be further refined to reduce the dependence 
on the use of ‘catch-all’ categories. 
14. The Task Force recommends the adoption of a full ‘access equals delivery’ system. 
Specifically, we recommend: 
• that  all  requirements  for  the  delivery  of  disclosure  documents  be  abolished  and,  instead,  that 
all disclosure documents be required to be filed on SEDAR and on the issuer’s website, and 
• that the elimination of any requirement to ‘deliver’ a document would render investor consent to 
‘access equals delivery’ unnecessary. 
15. The Task Force recommends that MERIT (Model for Effective Regulatory 
Information Transfer) be thoroughly considered and that securities regulators 
encourage and facilitate the use of XBRL, information layering and interactivity 
within electronic disclosure documents, all as detailed in the technical White Paper 
included at Schedule 4-A. 
16. The Task Force recommends that, until MERIT and the use of XBRL can be 
 
implemented, paper-based disclosure be presented in layered format with each layer 
being of increasing depth and complexity, thereby allowing investors to determine 
the depth of disclosure which is informative for them. 
17. The Task Force recommends that financial literacy be treated as a matter of national 
priority. 
18. The Task Force recommends the creation of a national coordinator of public and 
private sector investor education initiatives. 
19. The Task Force recommends that further study be undertaken by capital markets 
stakeholders to design programmes that ensure that the objective of financial literacy 
as a national priority is achieved. 
20. The Task Force recommends that insiders of an issuer be obliged to give at least two 
business days advance notice of their intention to sell some or all of their securities 
in the issuer. 
 
Recommendations regarding accessing the Canadian capital markets 
 
21. The Task Force recommends that a Canadian version of the ‘well-known seasoned 
issuer’ concept be introduced in Canada to allow eligible issuers the ability to access 
the capital markets with increased speed. 
22. The Task Force recommends that Canadian well-known seasoned issuer (C-WKSI) 
status be granted to those issuers meeting the qualification criteria for the POP 
system and with market capitalizations of $350 million and over. 
23. The Task Force recommends that C-WKSIs be permitted to come to market in a 
 
follow-on offering with an offering document (that would not be subject to regula- 
tory review) which contains only the details of the offering, the use of proceeds and 
related disclosure which would be tantamount to a material change statement. 
24. The Task Force recommends that the certificate of a C-WKSI using  a  C-WKSI 
offering document speak only to material facts as at the date of the C-WKSI’s last 
annual information form  and material changes since that  date, specifically saying: 
‘The foregoing, together with the documents incorporated by reference herein, 
constitutes full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts as at [the date of the 
last filed Annual Information Form] and of all material changes in the business and 
affairs of [issuer] since that date.’ 
25. The Task Force recommends the underwriter’s certificate for offerings by C-WKSIs 
take into account the restricted time that underwriters will have to complete a full- 
blown due diligence review of the issuer, specifically saying: ‘To the best of our 
knowledge, information and belief, based on a review reasonable under the 
circumstances, the prospectus constitutes full, true and plain disclosure of all 
material facts as at [the date of the last filed Annual Information Form] and of all 
material changes in the business and affairs of [issuer] since that date.’ We would 
expect that securities regulators would provide guidance as to how the standard of 
reasonable review could be achieved. 
26. The Task Force recommends broadening the category of individual regarded as an 
accredited investor under the private placement exemptions to include not only 
those who are wealthy, but also those who rely on a registered adviser. The limits on 
 
this exemption would be: (i) sales (utilizing the exemption) limited to no more than 
50 investors for any one  private placement, (ii) the issuer must be a ‘reporting 
issuer’, and (iii) a registered adviser would be prohibited from advertising to 
encourage investors to rely on this exemption and sales under this exemption would 
only be permitted to clients with whom the registered adviser had a pre-existing 
relationship. 
27. The Task Force recommends that hold periods for privately placed securities of 
reporting issuers be eliminated. 
 
Recommendations regarding the regulation of hedge funds 
28. The Task Force recommends that a regulatory framework be established for the 
public offering of hedge funds just as a regulatory framework was established for the 
public offering of mutual funds and that while the framework will incorporate full 
regulation some of the features will be as follows: 
• full disclosure of all performance, management, administrative, referral and other fees (including the 
compensation of the investment adviser and manager), 
• a description of the relationship  between  the  hedge  fund  manager,  adviser,  administrator 
and prime broker and appropriate cautionary language regarding any conflicts of interest between 
them, 
• mandatory disclosure of any ‘side letter’ and other collateral agreements between the hedge fund and 
investors who receive special fee or liquidity arrangements, 
• a description of the mechanism or process by which the assets of the hedge fund are valued, 
• a description of the hedge fund structure and its investment strategies and 
• in the case of principal protected note products linked to hedge funds, a full description of the 
 
underlying hedge fund or fund of hedge funds incorporating all of the features listed above. 
29. The Task Force recommends that the distribution of principal protected notes where 
the economic value is based upon an underlying hedge fund be regulated according 
to the nature of the underlying investment rather than according to the exempt 
character of the related principal protected note with which the underlying 
investment is ‘wrapped’. 
30. The Task Force recommends that all financial intermediaries selling hedge fund 
products and other structured products, such as principal protected notes linked to 
an underlying hedge fund, be required to meet certain proficiency requirements to 
ensure that they properly understand the products they are selling. 
31. The Task Force recommends that consideration be given to the registration of hedge 
fund managers in order to ensure that there is an appropriate level of regulatory 
oversight of the activities of the manager as well as its capitalization and governance 
procedures. 
 
Recommendations regarding the enforcement of securities laws 
32. The Task Force recommends that a co-operative national programme be established 
and funded by securities regulators, self-regulatory organizations (SROs) and law 
enforcement agencies: (i) to establish priorities for enforcement, (ii) to develop 
reporting systems that would provide a basis for assessing the effectiveness of 
enforcement processes in achieving their objectives, (iii) to identify and collect any 
additional relevant data, and (iv) to report the data and their qualitative analysis of 
 
it to an independent research body which will evaluate and issue public reports on 
the effectiveness of enforcement processes. 
33. The Task Force recommends that a study be undertaken to assess the needs for 
police services in the investigation of capital market crime in various jurisdictions, 
and to inquire into the appropriate contributions that should be made by municipal, 
provincial and federal police services. 
34. The Task Force recommends that a study be undertaken to assess the needs for 
investigative services by securities regulatory authorities in various jurisdictions, and 
the capacity to provide those services effectively. 
35. The Task Force recommends that if the Integrated Market Enforcement Teams 
(IMETs) established by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are to succeed, there 
must be a renewed and continuing commitment to developing and retaining the 
expertise required to lead and conduct complex investigations of capital markets 
offences by: 
• identifying and reviewing the competencies that are required, 
• recruiting officers and other staff with specialized backgrounds, 
• providing professional development and mentoring programmes, 
• establishing  and  complying  with  policies  that  restrict  secondments  of  these  officers  to  other 
duties, and 
• establishing  and  complying  with  promotion  policies  that  enable  investigators  to  establish 
long-termcareers in the investigation of capital market crimes. 
36. The Task Force recommends that either the capacity of IMETs should be expanded 
to conduct all the necessary criminal investigations relating to capital markets, or the 
 
capacity of other police agencies should be enhanced in order to address the kinds of 
cases that IMETs is not authorized or able to undertake. 
37. The Task Force recommends that the role of IMETs in each locale should be defined 
in accordance with the investigation needs in that locale, without diluting the overall 
mandate and accountability of IMETs. 
38. The Task Force recommends that to make the best use of limited investigative 
resources within each jurisdiction, it will be necessary to establish processes for 
consultation, co-operation and co-ordination among all levels of police forces and 
the enforcement staff of securities regulators. 
39. The Task Force recommends that IMETs and other police forces recognize the prime 
responsibility of securities regulators to intervene early in a securities matter to 
preserve assets, protect investors, and, if possible, protect the long-term viability of 
the issuer. They should co-operate in obtaining and sharing evidence and 
information both to support that responsibility, and, as appropriate, to investigate 
suspected crimes with a view to prosecuting those responsible. 
40. The Task Force recommends that consideration should be given to processes for 
focusing and expediting investigation, and ensuring quality control and the exercise 
of good judgment. What is needed, in each IMET locale and each securities 
regulator, is an experienced lawyer with the seniority, status and confidence to 
exercise independent and sound judgment, a record of skills in supervision and 
management, and expertise (or the ability to acquire it expeditiously) in the 
specialized field of capital markets regulation. The role of this individual, whom we 
 
refer to as a ‘Senior Independent Review Officer’, would be to provide focus, 
supervision and a locus of accountability for strategic decisions in an investigation. 
He or she should have status similar to that of a Securities Commissioner. Such 
persons might be found among the senior ranks of counsel in private practice or the 
prosecution service. In particular, they may be found among individuals recently 
retired who remain at the peak of performance, and can bring their abilities and 
experience to bear. 
41. The Task Force recommends that investigators have access to effective legal advice in 
the course of an investigation. However, it must be provided by individuals who will 
not be involved in the prosecution of the case. 
42. The Task Force recommends that every effort be made to enable IMETs to complete 
current investigations expeditiously and in a focused manner. 
43. The Task Force  recommends that  consideration be given to  the accountability 
structure for IMETs, and the need to develop a national enforcement strategy that 
takes into account the strategic importance of investigation to the effectiveness of 
securities regulation in the provinces. 
44. The Task Force recommends that in light of concerns expressed about constitutional 
hurdles to the sharing of information by regulatory investigators and police 
investigators, protocols be developed to guide those who must determine and 
substantiate the point at which a regulatory investigation crystallizes into an 
investigation for the purpose of criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution, and 
specifying the investigatory techniques that can be employed at various stages of 
 
inspection and investigation. 
45. The Task Force recommends that the securities regulator’s Senior Independent 
Review Officer, recommended in recommendation 40, should also have independent 
authority to determine whether a matter should be sent forward for hearing by the 
securities tribunal. 
46. The Task Force recommends that processes should be instituted for identifying 
priorities in the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  regulatory  matters,  and 
ensuring that enforcement processes are being used effectively in addressing those 
priorities. 
47. The Task Force recommends that the securities regulator’s Senior Independent 
Review Officer, recommended in recommendation 40, should also have independent 
authority to determine whether a matter should be sent forward for prosecution as a 
provincial offence. 
48. The Task Force recommends that where the Senior Independent Review Officer has 
authorized prosecution of a provincial offence, it may be appropriate to authorize 
counsel employed or retained by the securities regulator to prosecute it. The provincial 
prosecution service should provide guidelines to assist in ensuring that such counsel 
are thoroughly familiar with the principles that govern the role of a prosecutor. 
49. The Task Force recommends that every effort be made to develop a nationally 
co-ordinated programme for the prosecution of capital markets cases, with a view to 
ensuring the development of a public prosecution service that has the experience, 
capability and commitment to meet the difficult challenge of prosecuting capital 
 
market offences. 
50. The Task Force recommends that the adjudicative functions of securities 
commissions be transferred to an independent tribunal or tribunals. Membership 
in the tribunal should be structured so as to ensure its expert knowledge of law, 
procedure and the operation of capital markets. Consideration should be given to 
the establishment of a national tribunal which could deploy hearing panels 
throughout the country as needed. 
51. The Task Force recommends that the National Judicial Institute (‘NJI’) develop 
programmes to prepare judges to manage the adjudication  of complex offences 
relating to capital markets and to understand the contexts in which they arise. The NJI 
should call upon the Canadian Securities Administrators, SROs and experienced 
counsel (for the prosecution and the defence) to participate in these programmes. 
52. The Task Force recommends the establishment of a separate capital markets court to 
which jurisdiction, both provincial and federal, is ceded. Such a court would have 
jurisdiction with respect to all capital markets regulatory offences and could 
potentially be granted jurisdiction over civil liability cases arising from capital 
markets regulatory violations. 
53. The Task Force recommends that legislatures consider enacting legislation similar to 
section 380.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada, to specify the aggravating circumstances 
that must be taken into account in imposing a sentence for offences under securities 
legislation and the non-mitigating factors that must not be taken into account. 
54. The Task Force recommends that, so far as possible, the penalties and orders 
 
available for the enforcement of securities laws should be harmonized across the 
country yet applied with regional sensitivity. 
55. The Task Force recommends that ministries and regulators review and harmonize 
provisions governing costs in securities matters, and consider adopting best 
practices of other jurisdictions, which should include: 
• authorizing   the   regulator   to   order   costs   in   favour   of   the   respondent   in   appropriate 
circumstances; 
• developing policies and guidelines regarding the circumstances in which costs may be ordered, the 
basis upon which costs will be calculated and the manner in which the respondent may test their 
calculation; 
• providing for review of costs orders by a person or body independent of the regulator; and 
• providing for the recovery of costs on usual principles, rather than requiring the payment of costs on 
the basis of full cost recovery to fund the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of securities 
matters. 
56. The Task Force recommends that when regulators identify a course of conduct that 
breaks no specific provision of securities laws, but arguably contravenes a declared 
principle of the law and is considered to be contrary to the public interest, they 
notify the capital markets that the course of conduct is unacceptable and will, 
if repeated, attract prosecution. 
57. The Task Force recommends that the ‘contrary to the public interest’ regulatory tool 
be used sparingly and only with the greatest care if the behaviour which is criticized 
has not been publicly identified in advance as unacceptable. Where the behaviour 
that is criticized has not been publicly identified, the contrary to the public interest 
provision should only be used if the conduct is egregious and a reasonable person in 
 
the circumstances would view it to be contrary to the public interest. If the conduct 
is not egregious, the public should be duly warned before any enforcement action is 
taken. The risk that so-called ‘gotcha’ enforcement brings the entire securities 
enforcement apparatus into disrepute must not be overlooked. 
58. The Task Force recommends that 
• securities regulators consider utilizing their jurisdiction to apply to courts more frequently for 
restitution, compensation and/or damages on behalf of aggrieved persons, 
• regulators and ministries should consider whether any further statutory provisions or regulations are 
required in order to provide the basis upon which these procedures may be invoked and 
• regulators should develop practice guidelines to facilitate appropriate use of these procedures. 
59. The Task Force recommends that consideration be given to authorizing securities 
tribunals to order compensation or restitution in appropriate circumstances. 
60. The Task Force recommends that consideration be given to 
• authorizing courts adjudicating capital markets offences under provincial or criminal legislation, 
and in appropriate circumstances, to make orders of restitution and compensation, and 
• establishing rules to ensure the fairness of the process. 
61. The Task Force recommends that securities regulators and Ministries monitor 
developments in class actions for failures of disclosure, with particular attention to 
concerns about the effective management of class actions. 
62. The Task Force recommends that the appropriate roles and jurisdiction of SROs in 
the enforcement of standards within the securities industry and the assessment of 
penalties be reviewed. In particular, consideration should be given to 
• whether SROs are exercising statutory powers of decision in their discipline jurisdiction and are 
 
subject to the protections guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
• in what circumstances and by what means SROs should be able to obtain production of documents 
from, and the attendance as witnesses of, former members and other third parties, 
• the means, if any, by which the decisions of SROs should be enforceable against former members, 
and 
• the circumstances and process by which an SRO could apply to a court for the appointment of a 
monitor. 
63. The Task Force recommends the provision of immunity from civil liability for those 
acting in good faith on behalf of SROs. 
64. The Task Force recommends that regulators consider the extent to which the new 
processes and requirements which have been established by SROs to provide 
arbitration and dispute resolution options to claimants should now be required, as a 
condition of recognition, for all SROs. 
65. The Task Force recommends that regardless of whether Canada adopts a unified or 
harmonized approach to securities regulation, it is fundamentally important that 
enforcement be managed on a national basis to ensure the effective use of resources, 
the development and deployment of expert skill and knowledge across the country, 
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